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T

HE STORY OF ADR in the US is one of ‘co-optation’ of what was to be a
serious challenge to formalistic and legalistic approaches to legal and social
problem solving and is now highly institutionalised by its more formal use
in courts.1 At the same time, use of private forms of dispute resolution in mediation,
arbitration and newly hybridised forms of dispute resolution among disputants who
can choose (and afford) to leave the formal justice system (in both large commercial
matters and private family matters) has resulted in claims of increased privatisation of
justice, with consequences for access to justice in different areas of legal dispute resolution. These consequences include difficulty of access to some forms of private dispute
resolution for those who cannot afford them and claims that, with mass exits from the
formal system by those who can afford to ‘litigate’ elsewhere, there is less interest in
judicial service and reform. In addition, in recent years consumers and employees have
1
See C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: The Law of ADR’ (1991) 19
Florida State Law Review 1.
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been subjected to contractual commitments to mandatory arbitration, sustained by the
US Supreme Court, which has all but eliminated choice about where to resolve certain
kinds of disputes. All of these claims are highly contested by practitioners, judges and
scholars of the American legal system.2
The uses of various forms of ADR are difficult to assess as much occurs in private,
non-reportable settings and there is no national or centralised form of ‘regulation’ of
dispute resolution in the US. As reported below, there are many sources of regulation
in case law, statutes and local procedural rules at both federal and state levels, but
much dispute resolution activity in the US remains private and market based, as parties
may choose contractually before, during or after a dispute has arisen, how to manage
their disputes—through private negotiation and settlement, mediation, arbitration,
fact-ﬁnding, neutral evaluation or a variety of newly hybridised forms of dispute resolution. There is no formal reporting requirement of such processes or their outcomes,
so much remains unknown about the actual dimensions of private dispute resolution,
now often fully approved of and sanctioned by public institutions. As this paper will
describe, dispute resolution in the US is now formal, informal and ‘semi-formal’.
The watershed years for regulation of formal dispute resolution in the US might be
considered to be both 1938 (the year that both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were drafted by a stellar committee of lawyers, judges and academics, and enacted (by
passive approval of the US Congress) and Erie v Tompkins3 was decided (ruling that
procedural rules were federal (national) and substantive rules would be state law in
diversity cases in American federal courts, thus overturning the prior practice of the
reverse, state procedural law in all federal courts with enforcement of ‘federal common
law’ for substantive decisions) and 1976 (when the Pound Conference on the Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice included a paper by
Harvard Professor Frank Sander4 which heralded the beginning of consideration for
formal judicial policy ‘varieties of dispute processing’, including mediation, arbitration,
neutral evaluation, fact-ﬁnding and ombuds as ‘alternatives’ to formal adjudication).
The juxtaposition of these important historical events in a single paragraph should
give one the sense that dispute resolution and its regulation in the US is inherently
complex, involving both national (what we call federal) and state regulation (with 50
different states), and a great variety of informal and private processes that remain
largely unregulated in the public sphere (though sometimes scrutinised in public litigation when constitutional, contractual or other challenges are made). This chapter
attempts to describe this complex legal landscape and, in the end, concludes that,
at least in the US, ‘model laws of ADR’ are unlikely to succeed at the national level.
Current efforts to create ‘uniform state laws’ (a separate process for making uniform
those subjects that transcend state boundaries, as in the Uniform Commercial Code5)
2
See, eg J Resnik, ‘Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication’
(1995) 10 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 211.
3
304 US 64 (1938).
4
FEA Sander, ‘Varieties of Dispute Processing’ in A Levin and R Wheeler (eds), The Pound Conference:
Perspectives on Justice in the Future (St Paul, MN, West Publishing Co, 1979) 111.
5
The National Conference on Commissioners for Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has successfully drafted
and promoted the Uniform Commercial Code for contract law, family law (adoption measures) and many
other subjects, but has been less successful in dispute resolution matters. At the time of writing, the Uniform
Mediation Act (2001) (specifying rules for conﬁdentiality in mediation) has been adopted in only 11 states,
making it hardly a ‘uniform’ regulation.
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have been largely unsuccessful in dispute resolution. The formal regulatory landscape
in dispute resolution in the US now consists of at least the following legal sources:
 The US Constitution (what process is ‘due’ in what (public) procedures and what
governmental bodies are assigned what dispute resolution functions, eg separation
of powers?)
 Federal legislation (eg Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,6 Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1996,7 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 19988)
 Federal rules of civil procedure (and criminal procedure for plea bargaining rules),
including
– Local rules for each federal district (94)
– Circuit Court of Appeals rules and practices for mediation and other forms of
settlement and ADR procedures (11 circuits and two specialty appeals bodies, for
trade and patents9)
 Common law jurisprudence and many precedents from US Supreme Court and
appellate federal courts on many ADR issues (including mandatory arbitration
(see below), conﬁdentiality, privileges, enforceability and ‘good faith’ participation
requirements, among others)
 Administrative agency rules and practices in a variety of subject areas, including
securities regulation, civil litigation, energy and environment, education, business
and commerce, labour and military procurement (and including a federal governmental coordinating body for ADR efforts in federal agencies10)
 State legislation (50 states and several territories, eg Puerto Rico)
 State common and decisional law11
 Uniform Mediation Act/ Uniform Arbitration Act (efforts to create common state
law regulation in different aspects of dispute resolution)
 Private contracts (specifying conditions and rules for dispute resolution, often
enforced by courts, making common law rulings (with precedential effects) and
including mass, trade association, institutional and organisational forms of
‘internal’ dispute resolution)
 Private decisional law (eg arbitration awards, some public (eg investment and
labour) and most private (eg commercial arbitration) awards
 Private organisational rule systems (eg American Arbitration Association rules for
arbitration, mediation; International Institute for Conﬂict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Association of Conﬂict Resolution (ACR), including
– Substantive
– Procedural and
– Ethical Rules
At the level of procedural rules, little was said in 1938 about anything other than
6

28 USC § 471.
5 USC § 571.
8
28 USC § 651.
9
RJ Niemic, Mediation and Conference Programs in the Federal Appeals Courts (Washington, DC,
Federal Judicial Center, 1997).
10
Office of Dispute Resolution, Department of Justice, Interagency Working Group on ADR, see <www.
usdoj.gov>.
11
See, eg J Coben and P Thompson, ‘Disputing Irony: a Systematic Look at Litigation about Mediation’
(2006) 11 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 43.
7
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formal trials, though innovations in information sharing and American-style discovery,
class actions, simplicity of pleading rules, and a rule (Rule 16) about pre-trial settlement conferences with judges introduced some new processes for dispute resolution
outside of a full-blown trial. Over the years, those rules have been amended many
times to include complex rules about settlement offers (Rule 68), the use of court
appointed special masters to facilitate discovery and settlement (Rule 53), limits on
discovery, and increased participation of both judges and court adjuncts to ‘intervene’ and promote settlement activity,12 among other relevant rule amendments, the
most important being the role that the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 83) allocates to
each individual federal trial (district) court (94 of them in 50 states) to make its own
‘local rules’, which has turned out to be a major source for ADR regulation in federal
courts.13 Over the years, most states have conformed their formal procedural rules to
look much like the federal rules, though with respect to ‘ADR’ some states took the
lead in promoting (and regulating) the use of court-adjunct processes to encourage
settlement (eg Massachusetts, Florida, Ohio, New York, Texas and California).14
After the procedural ‘revolution’ in 1938, American formal law turned most of its
attention to creating new substantive rights, through the activism of a variety of social
and legal movements, civil (and now human) rights, consumer rights, women’s rights,
environmental protection, gay rights and anti-poverty activism, using both legislation
and litigation to create, establish and litigate about these new legal rights and entitlements. At the same time, the procedural innovation of class actions led to many more
law suits to efficiently claim on behalf of discriminated individuals and groups, securities and consumer frauds, mass tort victims and other aggregated claims. All of this
led to an expansive increase in litigation and to the somewhat contested claim that the
US was the most litigious nation in the world.15
The movement for more ‘informal’ justice in the US in the late 1970s and early
1980s16 drew its inspirations from a variety of sources, including the desire for
qualitatively better options and solutions for dispute resolution problem solving in
substance,17 and more party participation and empowerment in procedure and process,
as part of larger political movements seeking democratic participation in the polity
and the legal system. The impetus for much procedural reform, however, came from
courts and judicial officials, including then Chief Justice Warren Burger, who sought
to decrease court dockets and case processing time, reduce litigation cost and complexity, and for the cynics among us, move cases away from federal courts to other
fora, including state courts, small claims venues, and other processes outside of the
courts, tied together in the nomenclature of ‘alternative’ dispute resolution. Thus,

12
See, eg C Menkel-Meadow, ‘For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement
Conference’ (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 485.
13
E Plapinger and D Stienstra, ADR and Settlement in the Federal District Courts (Washington, DC,
Federal Judicial Center, 1996).
14
See N Rogers, C McEwen, S Cole, J Coben and P Thompson Mediation, Law Policy and Practice, 3rd
edn (St Paul, MN, Thomson Reuters, 2011).
15
M Galanter, ‘Reading the Landscape of Our Disputes: What We Know, Don’t Know (and Think We
Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society’ (1983) 31 UCLA Law Review 4.
16
RL Abel (ed), The Politics of Informal Justice: The American Experience (New York, Academic Press,
1982).
17
C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Toward another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving’
(1984) 31 UCLA Law Review 754.
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from the beginning, at least two different motivations for alternative or less formal
processes were present—the ‘quantitative-efficiency’ concerns to make justice more
accessible, cheaper, faster and efficient, and the more ‘qualitative-party empowering’
ideas that, with greater and more direct party participation, and identiﬁcation of
underlying needs and interests, parties might identify more tailored solutions to their
problems that would be less brittle and binary than the win/lose outcomes of formal
courts, with ‘limited remedial imaginations’.18
In recent years, the progress of dispute resolution variations has been labeled, by
this author, as ‘process pluralism’,19 and by others as ‘appropriate’ (not alternative)
dispute resolution, connoting recognition that not all matters should be subjected to
the same treatment—‘one size of legal process does not ﬁt all’. Different kinds and
numbers of parties, issues, structures of disputes and legal matters might dictate different formats of dispute processing.20 This is a serious questioning of the American
procedural ideal of ‘transsubstantive’ procedure,21 and such claims invoke both notions
of ‘technocratic’ assignment of cases to efficient or appropriate fora,22 as well as
more deeply jurisprudential concerns about whether different processes are necessary
to ensure different kinds of justice in different situations. Must ‘all cases’ be treated
‘alike’ or, if ‘like cases’ are to be treated ‘alike’, how do we know which cases are ‘like
enough’ each other to be treated with the same process and procedure?
Debates about ‘the vanishing trial’23 and the loss of formal procedures, as fewer and
fewer cases make it all the way to full adjudication in the US (only about 2 per cent of
cases ﬁled in a wide variety of courts, both federal and state, general and specialised,
now go on to full trial), have raged among scholars, judges and lawyers, as there is
now concern, on the part of some, that not enough cases are available to generate
the precedents we need in a common law, stare decisis legal regime to transparently
produce reasoned rules and principles for the governance of our society.24 As I argued
some years ago, this is a question of ‘Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?’25—the parties
seeking dispute resolution or the larger society that needs transparent and certain
kinds of (adversarial?) processes to produce law and justice for the ‘many’ out of the
disputes of the ‘few’.
The relationship of process to assessments of justice is a serious jurisprudential
question, considered by many procedural theorists. A separate ﬁeld of ‘procedural justice’
or ‘the social psychology of justice’ has claimed for decades, through empirical study,

18

Ibid.
C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes’ (2006)
94 Georgetown Law Journal 553.
20
C Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Processing and Conﬂict Resolution: Theory, Practice, and Policy (Burlington, Ashgate Press, 2003).
21
SN Subrin, ‘The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits
All” Assumption’ (2010) 87 Denver University Law Review 377.
22
The idea that the ‘forum should ﬁt the fuss’ was originally Professor Maurice Rosenberg’s (Columbia
University) is now captured by FEA Sander and SB Goldberg, ‘Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User Friendly
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure’ (1994) 10 Negotiation Journal 49.
23
M Galanter, ‘The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts’ (2004) 1 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 459.
24
SN Subrin, ‘Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Reasonable Prospect of Trial’ (2011) 46 Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 399; O Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073.
25
C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases)’ (1995) 83 Georgetown Law Journal 2663.
19
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that users of dispute resolution process assess the ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ of processes
independently from the outcomes parties achieve.26 From the American side, I have long
claimed that Lon Fuller is our ‘jurisprudent of process’,27 for in a series of articles Fuller
has argued that each different process, whether adjudication, arbitration, mediation, legislation or regulation (and other processes, such as voting) has its own ‘integrity’—that
is, its own norms, ethics and types of outcomes produced, each requiring its own philosophical justiﬁcation, as well as the possibility of its own set of ‘rules’.28
In the modern-day experience of so many varied processes used for dispute
resolution (reviewed below), I often ask if Lon Fuller would approve of the great
hybridisation of process that has occurred in recent decades, with such new forms
as mediation and arbitration combined to form med-arb or arb-med29 (in labour,
family, commercial disputes), ‘early neutral evaluation’30 or ‘settlement conferences’, a
process comprising both judges and lawyers, giving evaluative feedback to counsel and
parties in pre-trial settings,31 ‘summary jury trials’32 (jury advisory opinions in public
courts for settlement purposes), ‘mini-trials’33 (private hybrid processes using witness
testimony, argument, negotiation, mediation and sometimes arbitration) and ‘private
judging’,34 where private parties hire judges to adjudicate matters in secrecy, with full
appellate processes and protection of the courts (as is authorised by state constitutions
and statutes, such as in California)—and now even private juries35 are hired to resolve
disputes outside of the courts, so there is independent lay fact-ﬁnding, but no public
record of the outcome or deliberations. What would Lon Fuller, and what should we,
scholars and practitioners of procedural law, make of all these various processes? How
do we know if these processes are fair, just and appropriate for either the parties
themselves or the larger system of legal dispute resolution?
In this chapter I will address these questions by suggesting that, in the US, we now
have more than ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ processes—we have many ‘semi-formal’ (hybrids
or mixtures of processes), and the question is how shall we evaluate the efficacy,
efficiency and legitimacy of so many different kinds of process. In the US, we have
26
EA Lind and T Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York, Plenum Press, 1988);
N Welsh, ‘Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice
Theories’ (2004) 54 Journal of Legal Education 49.
27
C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Mothers and Fathers of Invention; The Intellectual Founders of ADR’ (2000) 16
Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 13.
28
K Winston (ed), The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon Fuller, revised edn (Oxford and
Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2001).
29
C Menkel-Meadow, L Love, A Kupfer Schneider, J Sternlight, Dispute Resolution: Beyond the Adversarial Model, 2nd edn (New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2011) 526–29; C Menkel-Meadow (ed), Complex Dispute
Resolution: Vol 1 Foundational Processes and Vol 2, Multi-Party Dispute Processes, Decision Making and
Democracy (Farnham, Ashgate Press, 2012).
30
W Brazil, ‘A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How They
Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten Important Values’ [1990] University of Chicago
Legal Forum 303.
31
C Menkel-Meadow, ‘For and Against Settlement: The Uses and Abuses of the Pre-Trial Settlement
Conference’ (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 485.
32
J Alﬁni, ‘Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions
of Participating Lawyers’(1989) 4 Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 213.
33
ED Green, The CPR Legal Program Mini-Trial Handbook (New York, Matthew Bender & Co, 1982).
34
Cal Civ Proc Code §§ 638-645 (West Supp 2004); Fla Stat Ann § 44.104 (West 2003 & Supp 2004); A
Kim, ‘Rent-a-Judges and the Cost of Selling Justice’ (1994) 44 Duke Law Journal 166.
35
M Jacobs, ‘Legal Beat: Private Jury Trials: Cheap, Quick and Controversial’, Wall Street Journal, 7
July 1997.
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a very elaborate formal justice system of federal and state rules of procedure (both
civil and criminal), as well as countless specialised tribunals with their own procedural
rules, such as in bankruptcy, labour, family law, securities, technology, trade, patent
and trademark, and taxes.
We also have many informal fora for dispute resolution, including private uses of
mediation, arbitration and related processes, religious courts and mediation agencies,
specialised business and industry panels of dispute resolution (eg banking, insurance,
franchise, construction, technology, sports and energy), using both mediation and
arbitration techniques,36 community and neighbourhood dispute resolution processes,37
online consumer forms of dispute resolution,38 internal organisational forms of
dispute resolution (ombuds or ‘IDR’ (internal dispute resolution39), including grievance
processes in large corporations, universities, trade unions, government agencies and
non-governmental institutions40), as well as dispute resolution fora even in illegitimate
enterprises—gangs41 and organised crime.
We now also have a more hybrid set of processes which can be called ‘semiformal’ forms of dispute resolution, which utilise both private and public processes
with increasingly structured and formal aspects of process, even if there is little to
no recourse to more formal adjudication or appellate review. These include the ‘ADR’
programmes ‘annexed’ to courts, with a great deal of federal and state variations in
rules, and access to courts after use, mandatory arbitration clauses found in many
consumer and business contracts, which obligate parties to use structured out of
court arbitration tribunals, some with very detailed procedural rules, but little to no
appeal to courts (under the Federal Arbitration Act’s limited grounds for vacatur of
an arbitration award42), as well as the elaborate structure of international commercial arbitration which is now quite ‘formal’ in its conduct, if still mostly unattached
to formal courts.43 Thus, the notion of any omnibus ‘regulation’ of ADR is simply
36

CPR Industry Panels Dispute Resolution.
S Merry and N Milner, The Possibility of Popular Justice: A Case Study of Community Mediation in
the United States (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1993).
38
E Katsh and J Rifkin, Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conﬂicts in Cyberspace (San Francisco,
Jossey Bass, 2001); MSA Wahab, E Katsh and D Rainey (eds), Online Dispute Resolution: Theory and
Practice (The Hague, Eleven International Publishing, 2012).
39
L Edelman, H Erlanger and J Lande, ‘Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights
in the Workplace’ (1993) 27 Law & Society Review 497.
40
W Ury, J Brett and S Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut Costs of Conﬂict
(San Francisco, Jossey Bass, 1988).
41
S Venkatesh, Gang Leader for a Day (New York, Penguin, 2008).
42
9 USC § 10; Hall Street Associates v Mattel, 552 US 576 (2008).
43
Y Dezalay and B Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996). But see A Stone Sweet,
‘Arbitration and Judicialization’(2011) 1(9) Onati Socio-Legal Series 1, who argues that some forms of
international arbitration (state–investor arbitration) are becoming increasingly judicialised by explicitly
publishing rulings, giving reasons in opinions and decisions, which include common legal doctrines like
proportionality and balancing, allowing amicus curiae briefs, treating past decisions as precedential and
arguing for appellate processes. Some scholars (I am among them, see C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Are Cross-Cultural Ethics Standards Possible or Desirable in International Arbitration?’ in P Gauch, F Werro, P Pichonnaz
(eds), Melangés en l’honneur de Pierre Tercier (Geneva, Schulthess, 2008)) think that even international
commercial arbitration, a creature of private contract, is in fact, dependent on the state—national courts
for enforcement and recognition of awards, pursuant to a public international law treaty (the New York
Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958) and that international
commercial arbitration is, in fact, creating a common law of modern lex mercatoria, T Carbonneau, Lex
Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law Merchant, (Huntington, NY, Juris Net, 1997).
37
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impossible to imagine in the US with this great variety of types of process and locations of process in both public and private, and now ‘hybrid’ spheres.
Years ago, in an effort such as the present one, I imagined that a ‘core’ set of
ethical guidelines for conducting mediation could be designed,44 and I spent ﬁve years
chairing a commission to write uniform ethical rules for lawyers serving as third-party
neutrals (arbitrators and mediators) in alternative processes45 (a subject that had never
been regulated by American ethical and professional responsibility rules for lawyers in
general).46 Though many private organisations have now followed with rules of ethics
(conﬁdentiality, conﬂicts of interest, etc) for third parties and advocates in ADR proceedings, there are in fact not that many ‘core’ principles upon which everyone can
agree. Even within the US, conﬂicts of interest, ex parte communications with arbitrators, practice with non-legal professionals, methods of fee payment,47 and a host of
other issues remain variable and contested.
As I have written before, when ADR is taken to multi-national or international
contexts, the issues become even more complicated, as different systems impose different rules with respect to such issues as whether witnesses may be prepared before
testimony (malpractice if not done in the US, unethical in England and Germany),
discovery, cross-examination, written versus oral testimony, conﬂicts of interest48 and
many other procedural differences. The European Directive on Mediation (2008/58/
EC) has an ethics code appended to it (European Code of Conduct for Mediators49),
but I predict that these principles will have many difficult legal and social cultural
issues in application, and they already fail to deal with all the issues that might arise
in a multi-national mediation setting.
For purposes of this chapter, I use the term ‘semi-formal’ from American etiquette
dressing requirements (‘smart casual’ is the British equivalent) to connote the attempt
to locate dispute processes half way between formal tuxedos or ‘black tie’ and evening
gowns of the bygone days of formal gatherings (and formal regulation), and the totally
informal or casual dress more common in today’s variety of professional, family and
44
C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Professional Responsibility for Third Party Neutrals’ (September 1993) 11(9)
Alternatives; C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Ancillary Practice and Conﬂicts of Interest: When Lawyer Ethics Rules
Are Not Enough’ (February 1995) 13(2) Alternatives.
45
CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, Model Rule for the Lawyer as Third
Party Neutral (2002), <www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/622/Model-Rule-for-TheLawyer-as-Third-Party-Neutral.aspx>.
46
There is now some minimal regulation in the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct which recognises that lawyers may serve in these capacities, MRPC Rule 2.2, but ‘tribunals’ to
which a lawyer owes a duty of candor includes arbitration, but excludes mediation (Rule 1.1 deﬁnition
(o)), which has been assimilated to include a slightly different set of ethics for negotiation found in Model
Rule 4.2 (allowing some forms of ‘puffing’ (exaggeration), no duty to disclose true ‘opinions’ or one’s real
principal).
47
Whether ADR should permit ‘contingent fees’ (or a percentage of the settlement amount for the
mediator or award for the arbitrator), as is permitted in American litigation, remains a hotly contested
subject. Some private mediators and arbitrators also charge very large (and unregulated) daily or hourly
fees as well, rising to as much as tens of thousands of dollars a day or many thousands of dollars an hour
in high stakes matters. For lawyers in more traditional practice, the ethics rules now require at least some
written disclosures of ‘reasonable’ fees, and in some settings (eg class actions, bankruptcy, and statutory fee
cases) there is some judicial review of fees in some matters.
48
C Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013).
49
The new International Mediation Institute (based in the The Hague) has also been promulgating suggested standards and rules for mediators, both for competence and ethics, and for cultural competency as
well, see <www.IMImediation.org>.
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entertainment gatherings. To request ‘semi-formal’ dress is to ask the gentlemen to
wear ties and jackets, if not tuxedos, and to hope that the women will wear, if not
dresses and skirts, than at least ‘fancy pants’. The idea is to preserve some notion of
order, elegance, solemnity and seriousness to the social event. Thus, ‘semi-formal’ uses
of mediation and arbitration in the courts suggest (sometimes falsely) that someone is
looking over or supervising the choice of mediators or arbitrators and ensuring their
competence and ethics, and, in some cases, permitting a further appeal to the blackrobed (and formal) adjudicator. What level of regulation is appropriate for formal,
informal and now ‘semi-formal’ dispute resolution remains, for me, somewhat problematic, as I report below on a wide variety of regulatory differences in both federal
and state courts in the US, as well as some private settings in which dispute resolution
occurs. More problematic is the assumption that ‘regulation’ will be effective and can
guarantee some measure of both quality of process and access to process in such a
variegated environment.
For example, the elaborate rules of the American Arbitration Association, if not
full-on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, still provide for some discovery and mandatory information exchange, that old American practice of document production and
factual inquiries of the other side, in person (depositions) and through detailed (and
costly) document and now computer searches, preliminary relief, and in some cases
the same relief (punitive damages) as courts would provide in the US. Though virtually all of this occurs without full public transparency or appellate review, at least
(in theory) everyone knows the rules they have selected (usually through contract or
selection of a particular arbitral administering institution). Recently in the US, many
efforts to challenge the true ‘voluntariness’ of these now ‘mandatory’ clauses to arbitrate contract, consumer, business and employment disputes have failed, as the formal
courts, including the US Supreme Court, have sustained contracts which require certain
forms of dispute resolution (usually arbitration), even where consumers and employees
do not really know or understand what they are signing.50
Totally casual or informal forms of dispute resolution are now called ‘litigationlite’ (arbitration) or ‘mediation-heavy’ (evaluative mediation where third party neutrals
decide or strongly suggest solutions to parties, rather than simply facilitating party
negotiation51), and occur without formal clarity about the procedural rules applied
or what can happen if the process fails. The question here is whether ‘semi-formal’
processes can legitimately operate in a space between the transparency and presumed
consistency of formal justice, and the conﬁdentiality, ﬂexibility and self-determination
of informal processes. Should we be subjecting different kinds of process to different

50
See, eg Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp 500 US 20 (1991); J Sternlight, ‘Fixing the Mandatory
Arbitration Problem: We Need the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009’ (2009) 16 Dispute Resolution Magazine
5; J Sternlight, ‘Is the US Out on a Limb? Comparing the US Approach to Mandatory Consumer and
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kinds of evaluative criteria and rules or should all process be judged by the same
criteria?
This increasing complexiﬁcation, segmentation and differentiation of process, which
was intended to express and be justiﬁed by such important justice values as party
choice, consent, self-determination and party-tailored solutions to problems, now
potentially threatens other justice notions of consistency, transparency, true consent
and knowledge, as well as equity, equal treatment, clarity, and socially ‘uniform’ and
just solutions.
By describing and reviewing some of the more interesting current developments in
modern American process pluralism here, I hope to expose the difficulties, paradoxes
and contradictions of processes that have different goals and purposes (especially if
parties have different goals and purposes within the same dispute), especially when
‘semi-formal’ is neither formal nor informal. Consider, as reviewed below, the paradox
of enforcing private arbitral awards in public courts, the absence of clear enforcement rules for private mediation, the conﬂicts of private religious ‘courts’ with public
values expressed in formal state courts,52 the role conﬂation of judges who mediate or
manage settlement conferences rather than adjudicate, and the absence of records by
which to judge any of this when parties choose to take their informal or semi-formal
dispute resolution processes to entirely private settings. To what extent do we need
‘formalism’ in the form of public or transparent, uniform rules of process and procedure to judge the legitimacy, fairness or justice of any particular dispute resolution
process? To what extent should different processes be permitted to have different forms
of legitimacy or justiﬁcation? Are values of ‘party control’ and ‘consent’ contradictory
to the needs of the state to provide ‘public justice’ and both procedural and substantive ‘transparency’? Is ‘process pluralism’ itself a ‘just’ good?

I I . TH E C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F ‘ F O R M A L ’ J U S T I C E

Conceptions of formal justice in modern American jurisprudence include, in a trial
or formal hearing setting, transparency or publicity of proceedings, reasoned legal
arguments based on legal precedent and ‘proven’ facts, including witness examination
and testimony, and discovery of facts, documents and information, even from adverse
parties and sources, public officials (whether elected or appointed in both state and
federal variations) as judges who advise fact ﬁnders (juries) about the law or engage in
fact-ﬁnding themselves, as well as make legal rulings, write formal, reasoned opinions
that have precedential or stare decisis impact on other, like, cases, and most importantly,
are governed by formal rules (Federal (or state) Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure),
and are subject to appellate and other review procedures.53 For Lon Fuller, adjudica-
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tion or ‘formal justice’ is warranted when there is a need for reasoned argument to
decide disputes, not only for the immediate disputants, but also to elucidate rules for
the larger society, especially when rights (and especially competing rights) are at issue.
Adjudication requires the decision of ‘authoritative’ and ‘neutral’ decision makers who
explain their reasons (assumed to be agreed to or binding on the disputants and the
larger society in which they are embedded), which are derived from what we now
commonly call ‘the rule of law’, or properly enacted law (legal positivism) or common
law interpretive law.
The third party neutral judge or ‘universal third’ (as historian Martin Shapiro
describes the role) is expected to be detached from the parties and the issues, and to
‘rule’ on the basis of agreed to substantive and procedural rules. This assumes the
foundational principle of ‘consent’ to the juridical form and ‘jurisdiction’ (power to
speak) of the tribunal. Many Anglo-American writers on formal justice also assume
a particular kind of process—adversary argument, with assumptions that ‘truth’, as
well as justice, will be produced by hearty and contested, if ‘policed’, production of
evidence, and arguments from ‘both’ (assuming two) sides.54 The neutrality and disinterestedness of the ‘decider’ or ‘arbiter’ in formal justice is so important to many
jurisprudes of formal process that any departure from the distinctive adjudicative role
(such as to ‘manage’ or mediate cases) is regarded as sullying the basic process.55
In summary, conceptions of the core aspects of formal justice include:
 Formal and clear rules of procedures, known to or consented to by the parties,
including allocation of tasks of production of proof and evidence rules
 Transparency/publicity of hearing
 Neutrality and disinterestedness of deciders of both fact (sometimes juries) and law
(judges)
 Access to information from all parties (under oaths of truth telling), with limited
conﬁdentiality or other policy protections
 Rights or ‘rule of law’ based outcomes and decisions
 With appropriate and authorised legal remedies ordered by
 Public officials (judges) or their delegates (juries), with
 Public and reasoned decisions explaining outcomes and legal basis of outcomes for
 Clariﬁcation of rules and basis of decision for the parties, and guidance for others
in similar situations
 Possibility of review of decisions for error or other faulty process or substantive
reasons
All of these elements deﬁne various aspects of the content of the American (and
Anglo) conception of ‘due process’. Unfortunately (for formal justice and the parties),
even some of the strongest proponents of the need for ‘adjudication’ in some circumstances (eg when ‘rights’ are necessary to make ‘right’) acknowledge that some situations call for different elements of dispute resolution or decision making both at the
individual (eg family or workplace) and societal (the polity) level. Lon Fuller acknowledged that some relationships (family, workplace, repeat commercial customers) and
some matters (the ‘polycentric’ dispute with many intersecting and mutually affecting
54
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issues) were better handled in other forms of resolution (mediation with trades, in
some settings, votes of aggregate masses in democratic legislatures, arbitration when
privacy, speed and consistency are desired). Rights sometimes conﬂict with each other,
without a clear or single allocation to ‘right’ (eg consider rights of privacy and public
rights to know; parental ‘rights’ in custody matters, and various conﬂicts in religious
and secular rights in modern constitutional orders). And even some important public
matters (eg domestic violence, child abuse, drug use) might be better handled with less
public adjudication (and shame) and more private and caring solutions (as in modern
problem-solving courts or private restorative justice settings). Categories of case types
and proper process treatments do not always neatly converge.
Thus, for Lon Fuller, ‘other’ processes are themselves morally, politically, socially
and legally legitimated by what parties might want or need, or the situation requires.
Fuller’s (and my own56) claims for other processes are based on the ‘integrity of process
differences’ themselves, not just the need for faster, cheaper or more efficient forms of
traditional adjudication. Parties might want to preserve relationships or communities
or workplaces without brittle, rigid or binary decisions (which could lead to desires
for revenge or retribution in repeat play settings). Parties might want to ‘share’ (eg
children in divorce) or preserve, rather than divide, resources. Rules of law might give
both or ‘all’ sides to a particular dispute similar or non-dispositive claims of right.
Coordinated, rather than competitive, action could lead to creative new outcomes and
solutions to new or unlegislated for problems or issues.57 Some communities might
prefer to resolve their disputes or solve their problems within their own community
norms.58

I I I . IN F O R M A L J U S T I C E I N T H E U S

Although there is a long history of informal justice in the US, with religious, local
community and business groups negotiating, mediating or arbitrating their own
disputes since the early colonial period and continuing to the present,59 modern
informal dispute resolution in the US is derived from several different substantive ﬁelds
(labour,60 commercial law, civil rights,61 environmental62 and family law63), a judicial
56
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movement (docket clearing efficiency64) and a social movement (party empowerment,
consumer65 and civil rights accountability and more tailored solutions to social and
legal problems) of the 1970s and 1980s, which together produced a turn to private
negotiation, mediation,66 community consensus building,67 and commercial arbitration
processes.68
Modern American dispute resolution has a strong intellectual grounding69 in
decision sciences,70 game theory,71 international relations, economics, social and cognitive psychology,72 anthropology,73 sociology74 and political science, as claims for ‘better’
solutions to legal and social problems were articulated with reference to ‘interest and
needs’-based negotiations,75 pie-expanding, not dividing, resource allocation,76 efficient
information sharing and processing,77 and a move away from purely ‘competitive’ processes to collaborative and coordinated decision making.78
In the 1970s and 1980s, theorists of better problem solving, combined with judicial
and political activists, called attention to many processes ‘alternative’ to court- and
formal-based dispute resolution, including dyadic and multi-party negotiation, mediation, arbitration and hybrid processes like community consensus building, ombuds
within organisations and victim–offender mediation in criminal matters.79 What was
formerly under the radar screen (negotiation as the most common form of dispute
resolution, through settlements prior to, during or even after trial) became the subject
of formal instruction in law schools, empirical and social science study,80 and policy
making by courts.81 Judges like Chief Justice Warren Burger, who wanted to reduce
64
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case loads in the courts, touted the advantages of more responsive, private forms of
dispute resolution in out of court negotiation, mediation and other forms of dispute
resolution. The US Congress appropriated money for ‘neighborhood justice centers’
which were to deal with ‘minor disputes’, using both lawyers and non-lawyer mediators for such matters as neighbourhood disputes, minor (misdemeanour) crimes, small
commercial disputes, landlord–tenant disputes and a variety of other matters. Restorative justice, in the form of victim–offender mediation, ‘healing’ and ‘sentencing circles’,
were derived from American (and Canadian and Australian) indigenous (‘Indian’)
groups to provide community-based alternatives to criminal punishment, especially, but
not exclusively, used for juvenile offenders. Such efforts at community-based restorative
justice are now used even in felony and serious crimes in a few pioneering states (eg
Wisconsin).82 National level processes, in other countries, are now used for restorative
justice in the form of truth and reconciliation commissions, supplemental to or substitutionary for formal adjudication in post-conﬂict, post-civil war and acknowledgement
of national wrongs (eg Canada Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation
Process83), but so far have been rejected with respect to the American experience of
slavery, destruction of indigenous communities and other national or government supported harms.
Specialised areas of law, like family law and labour law,84 had long used informal
processes, like negotiation and mediation, for dispute resolution, but the practices of
both family and labour mediation began to be applied and opened out to a greater
variety of legal (class actions, torts and contracts claims), political (resource allocation,
environmental disputes, local government disputes) and social disputes (community
policing, racial tensions, ethnic tensions, educational institutions). Lawyers and law
students, as well as other professionals, began to seek training in mediation and the
‘healing arts’, as well as continuing study of more conventional litigation skills. To
date, however, there is virtually no official licensing or credentialing for mediators or
other dispute resolution professionals.85
Perhaps most interestingly, various forms of ‘informal’ dispute resolution have been
used to great effect in ‘extra-, non- or il-’ legal enterprises. The ﬁlm The Godfather
dramatised the use of ‘elder’ mediation in resolving disputes within the ‘cosa nostra’
(Maﬁa) and, more recently, sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh gained access to both internal
gang mediation and informal ‘community policing’ mediation of gang-related disputes
in Chicago, within gangs and in relations that gang members have with the larger community.86 I have come to call this form of informal dispute resolution A2 (alternative
alternative) Dispute Resolution, having learned some years ago about the effectiveness
of gang leaders in mediating disputes in the favellas of Rio de Janeiro.87
Those who were dissatisﬁed with the ‘limited remedial imaginations’ of courts’
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limited power to order creative relief88 or the ‘adversarial culture’ of legal problem
solving,89 and others who wanted to encourage more direct party participation without
the need for professionals (lawyers and judges) in dispute resolution, combined to form
what was later called the ‘informal justice movement’.90 This social movement encouraged individuals and communities to seek resolution of social, political, economic
and even legal problems outside of the courts, using community mediation, consensus
building, group organising and strategies that allowed more than two parties to seek
resolution of problems by negotiated and ‘consensual’, not court-commanded, solutions. In the private corporate sector, hundreds of Fortune 500 companies and their
large law ﬁrms signed the ‘Center for Public Resources Pledge’ to pursue out of court
dispute resolution procedures with each other before continuing or initiating litigation. Over time, these ‘informal’ processes were criticised for ‘privatising’ justice that
many thought should remain in the public and formal sector91 for transparency of
process, generation of public precedential rulings and equalisation of unequal power
or economic endowments. Others, including this author, continued to maintain that
some aspects of ‘informal’ dispute resolution (absence of some formal rules, conﬁdentiality, ‘trading of preferences’, creation of new party-speciﬁc norms and tailored
solutions to problems) produced better ‘justice’ for some, if not all, disputants. Thus,
core claims of value for ‘informal’ justice included:












Direct party empowerment and participation in case ‘presentation’ and resolution
Self-determination
Consent
Tailored solutions, based on party needs and interests, not necessarily ‘rights’ and
claims of law (utilising tailored individual, religious, ethical or communitarian principles for resolution, eg ‘joint custody’ in divorce and children’s custody)
Non-monetised outcomes and solutions (apologies, trades, in-kind, other forms of
‘relief’)
Future, not just past, oriented problem solving, without need necessarily of fact
ﬁnding or assessment of blame
Conﬁdentiality, producing the opportunity for changed ‘positions’, trades and
non-precedential accommodations or solutions, as well as privacy protection for
disputants of all kinds, individuals and organisations
Inclusion of more than two litigant ‘parties in interest’ (multi-party dispute
resolution)
Reduction of elite and professional decision makers in parties’ lives and disputes,
utilisation of party ‘consent’, not command, as legitimating value
Flexible, situation speciﬁc, rules and practices of proceedings
Contingent solutions (capable of being revisited with changing conditions) without
precedential force or rigidity
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 ‘Reorientation’ of the parties to each other92—promoting healing relationships,
not rupture and continued conﬂict and resentment of formal litigation or punitive
results in criminal matters93
 Potentially faster and cheaper dispute resolution (‘efficiency’)
 Greater legitimacy of and compliance with party-chosen outcomes
The relative success and power of some forms of informal processes led, beginning in
the 1980s, to adaptations and transformations of private informal processes like negotiation, mediation and arbitration, and their hybrids, to use in more public settings—
thus courts began to ‘annex’ mediation and arbitration processes (and in some cases
to make them mandatory), business began to formalise, in contracts, uses of mandatory arbitration, and a variety of organisations began to ‘internalise’ and mandate
the use of informal grievance processes as a condition precedent of any recourse to
public and formal litigation processes. At the same time, even formal public court
processes began to use and transform themselves into more ‘informal’ processes such
as ‘problem-solving courts’ in drug, youth, family, mental health and vice courts,94 the
pre-trial settlement conference morphed into a mediation session,95 and multi-party
participatory consensus building fora turned into public ‘negotiated rule-making’ proceedings in administrative and regulatory law and proceedings,96 all of which eventually received legal recognition in formal rules and legislative authorisations.97 Uses
of informal negotiation and dispute resolution processes (hybrids of mediation and
arbitration) were increasingly used to settle mass class actions in tort, consumer law,
securities, employment and other matters,98 and even single dramatic mass disasters
like the deaths arising out of the 11 September 2001 terror attack on New York99
were dealt with by use of informal settlement processes with public funds and public
recognition. The ‘informal’ has become ‘semi-formal’.

I V . ‘S E M I - F O R M A L ’ J U S T I C E I N T H E U S

With the expansion and acceptance of ideas of informal consensual problem solving
and dispute resolution in the early 1990s, all branches of the US government responded.
Courts began, at both federal and state levels, to offer, at ﬁrst voluntary, then later
mandatory, programmes of court-annexed mediation and arbitration processes, and
92
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later included such processes as ‘early neutral evaluation’ (a process in which counsel
in a case meet with a volunteer or paid lawyer to review claims, schedule discovery
and information exchange, pursue settlement and get an informal ‘evaluation’ of the
merits of the case). A few innovative judges, like Thomas Lambros in Ohio and Jack
Weinstein in New York, began to adapt private settlement techniques for public cases.
Lambros originated the ‘summary jury trial’m in which lawyers (and witnesses) presented shortened versions of their cases (usually in no more than one day) to those
in the jury venire for an ‘advisory opinion’ by the jurors for use in further case settlement negotiations. This practice was criticised as conﬂating the public function of the
jury,100 whose members came to court expecting to ﬁnd facts in a litigated case, and
instead were used to assist private negotiation discussions. Summary jury trials were
often used in high-value fact disputes (asbestos and other mass claims) in order to
set baseline lay fact evaluations of the quality of formal proof and evidence. When
some judges ordered the use of this process in individual cases (eg civil rights) against
the will of the parties, litigants began to appeal to higher courts and the process has
declined in usage in recent years. Legal questions also were raised about whether there
could be public access to these proceedings, which were a hybrid of private negotiations, but conducted in a public courtroom.101
Federal District Judge Jack Weinstein, among others, used the formal Civil Procedure Rule permitting the use of Special Masters (Fed R Civ Proc 53) to organise
discovery and case evaluation in complex cases (also asbestos and other mass claims
and class actions, as in the famous Agent Orange case102) and then permitted special
masters (such as the now similarly famous Ken Feinberg, special master of the 9/11
Fund) to act as mediators in settling such cases, with some controversial imprimatur
of the judicial office.103
The 1980s and 1990s saw modiﬁcation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
allow the use of some of these settlement practices (Rule 16 was amended to make
negotiation of settlement an explicit part of the pre-trial conference and many federal
courts used the local rule power of Fed R Civ Proc 83 to craft local rules for the use
of ADR in ‘court annexed’ programmes).104 The federal courts in New York City, San
Francisco, Boston and Washington, DC were among the early pioneers of complex
menus of ADR choices and requirements to use some form of ADR.105 Now, by virtue
of federal legislation, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (requiring all federal courts
to implement some cost and delay ameliorative programmes), the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (allowing experimentation with mandatory
arbitration in federal courts), the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990
(authorising the use of negotiated rulemaking processes in administrative regulation)
and, ﬁnally, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (requiring all federal courts
to implement some programme of ADR, while allowing each district court to decide
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what is best for its region), virtually every federal court in the US has some form of
ADR. These courts report on the usage rates of mediation, arbitration, and settlement programmes in a non-uniform manner. Statistical reports available from many
of the most populous states (including New York, California, Texas and Michigan; see
below) demonstrate high usage of a variety of non-trial forms of dispute resolution,
within the formal court, with ‘settlement rates’ ranging from 30 per cent to over 70
per cent in some courts. Virtually all of the federal courts of appeals now have formal
mediation programmes, most with full-time staffs, a few relying on volunteer mediators106 (this author has been a mediator in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals and has also trained the staff and volunteer mediators, as well as judges, in
many federal courts).
Even the executive branch of the US government strongly encouraged use of ADR.
During President Clinton’s presidential term, Attorney General Janet Reno required
mediation training of herself and her senior staff (I performed this training), authorised an ‘ADR czar’ position in the Justice Department, currently the Program of
Dispute Resolution in the Justice Department, allocated funds for the settlement of
cases involving the federal government, and changed policies having to do with federal
government participation in arbitration and mediation programmes. In addition, an
Interagency ADR Working Group representing all the major federal agencies began
to meet regularly to discuss dispute resolution programmes throughout the federal
government. Many agencies now provide for ‘collateral duty’ in which employees in
one agency act as mediators or dispute resolution consultants to other agencies in the
government (thus providing some neutrality and lack of conﬂict of interest in internal
agency matters). An awards programme honoured such branches of the government
as the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy for instituting non-litigation dispute
resolution processes in procurement contracts, and later even in dispute resolution
issues in war zones.107 In addition, many federal agencies now have internal dispute
resolution programmes, including ombuds to resolve internal conﬂicts108 (employment, policy), as well as to deal with disputes with clients or customers of particular
agencies (eg Environmental Protection Agency, Securities and Exchange Commission,
National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy).
These uses of ‘informal’ dispute processes within the formal government are one
form of ‘semi-formal’ dispute resolution, sometimes, but not always, authorised by
regulation, at other times just by agreed-to practices or recommendations. Practices
can change with the change of political administration. To what extent should formal
rules of procedure, requirements of transparency, publicity, rule of law, appeals from
decisions or mediation or negotiated agreements be applied to such processes? To what
extent are such processes really ‘consensual’? And if, instead, they are ‘mandated’, what
redress is there to formal courts? Finally, questions have been raised about whether
these processes really do live up to their promises and intended goals.
In the middle of the 1990s, the federal government supported a major $5 million
research programme (ﬁelded by the RAND Corp) to determine if ADR in the courts
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really did ‘reduce cost and delay’. The results were decidedly mixed and controversial.
RAND found that there was little actual reduction in cost and delay in courts that
used mediation, arbitration or early neutral evaluation processes,109 but the RAND
study itself was criticised for studying a moving target. Many of the courts in the
study were changing their policies to conform to the legislation discussed above as
the study was ongoing. Courts in the federal system that were ‘matched’ because of
similar caseloads for comparison and ‘control’ purposes were, in fact, quite different,
geographically, culturally and in terms of their caseloads.110 At the same time as the
RAND study was conducted, a smaller study, also funded by the federal government
(by the Federal Judicial Center), did ﬁnd that certain ADR practices in the courts were
effective in reducing time to trial and total costs for ﬁnal dispute resolution.111 Both
studies found considerable user satisfaction with different court-based dispute resolution options, even where respondents had no comparison base because they could not
take their single dispute to different or controlled treatments for comparison.112 Thus,
the effectiveness, efficiency and efficacy of ADR in the courts, as compared to an evershrinking number of cases actually tried in courts (what is an appropriate ‘baseline’
measure of ‘normed’ dispute resolution?), continues to be vociferously contested and
debated among legal practitioners and scholars.
As the courts and formal governments have made more use of informal processes,
there has also been a growth and extension of informal processes becoming more
‘semi-formal’ in the private sector. With the modern growth of ADR in the 1980s,
the prime movers were actually large American corporations which, in 1979, founded
the Center for Public Resources to promote the uses of mediation, arbitration and
other private consensual processes in American business.113 Commercial arbitration has
always been a common way to resolve disputes among and within participants in the
same industry,114 but in the 1980s large corporations, through CPR, signed a ‘pledge’
to pursue ADR ﬁrst when disputing with each other (within and across industries).
Though not all members were compliant—many corporations continued to use traditional lawsuits—CPR used its bully pulpit and private funds to promote the use of
both traditional forms of ‘A’DR and help develop new ones—such as the ‘mini-trial’.
The mini-trial allowed private companies (the ﬁrst big case was TRW v Telecredit in
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a patent infringement dispute) to privatise their dispute (protecting conﬁdentiality of
evidence, trade secrets, customer lists, experts), choose the decision makers (expert
arbitrators or facilitative mediators) and the form of process (negotiation, mediation
and witness examination), and control costs and evidence presented. Mini-trials were
used in a wide variety of large cases in the 1980s and 1990s, concurrent with continued use of courts in cases where large companies were sued by customers or in class
action securities, mass torts, consumer or employment matters. Most recently CPR
has developed a new pledge for the twenty-ﬁrst century, encouraging corporations,
in times of economic downturns, to develop more ‘systematic approaches’ to dispute
resolution management, as a good business management principle—encouraging more
system design of iterative dispute resolution, more early dispute settlement, and recognition that there are many possible ways to resolve corporate disputes outside of
costly litigation, including internal conﬂict audits, accountability for dispute costs to
functional, not legal units, and other business management devices.115
Thus, private ADR was often combined with public ADR and different processes
are selected for use against and with different classes of parties. In general, many
courts allowed stays of public litigation while parties pursued various forms of private
ADR. CPR, as well as the American Arbitration Association, another private provider
of dispute resolution services, also developed formal protocols for industry-wide and
speciﬁc forms of dispute resolution—thus, oil and gas, franchise, construction, health
care and hospital, labour management, mass disasters, environmental, pharmaceutical and other industry-speciﬁc ‘model rules and clauses’ for dispute resolution were
drafted and disseminated. In some industries, the success of these private protocols
and ‘model rules’ provides a fully formalised alternative to the public justice system.
In addition to these private tribunals serving industry, several new providers of
dispute resolution services emerged in the 1980s. The Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (now known solely by its acronym JAMS) was founded by a state court
judge in California who retired from the bench to found one of the most successful
purveyors of private dispute resolution services, now serving all the major commercial
centres in the US (and now including offices in many world capitals) and beginning
to compete with the international tribunals (the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris, the London Court of International Arbitration, the AAA’s Center for International Dispute Resolution, the Hong Kong, Cairo and Stockholm tribunals for
international dispute resolution) for arbitration and mediation services. Former judges
and private attorneys now earn upwards of $5,000 per day for private dispute resolution services.
In international settings, arbitration may be enforced in national courts where
countries have signed on to the UN New York Convention for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958); domestically enforcement is through
the Federal Arbitration Act, as if a court judgment has been rendered (with a limited
number of grounds for vacatur). In contrast, mediation agreements in the US have no
more formal legal force than a contract and must be sued on for enforcement as with
any private contract. This is in contrast to some other countries (eg Israel) which now
treat mediation agreements, in some settings, as if they were arbitration awards, with
relatively easy enforcement in courts.
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As commercial arbitration has emerged as an important (but still not the only
preferred) form of dispute resolution116 between and among commercial parties, large
companies, in ﬁelds ranging from telecommunications to health and hospitals, banks,
car rentals and computers, etc, have now imposed mandatory ‘private’ arbitration on
consumers and employees, a practice that has been sustained against many legal attacks,
by the US Supreme Court.117 The US is an outlier in permitting this form of private
dispute resolution to be mandated in private contracts, without, so far, guaranteed
recourse to a public court challenge, except in a few limited instances. Even claims of
unconscionability or other coerced contract defences have been rejected in this context.
Thus, ‘informal’ private contractual arbitration (often dictated by the terms of a form
contract written by a powerful corporation) has become the ‘norm’ for many kinds of
disputes. Recently a courageous (former lawyer) individual complainant tried to use a
small claims court as a way around some of the contractual limits of arbitration and
class action litigation. Her victory in the small claims court was reversed on appeal
taken by the losing company (Honda).118 There have been increasing efforts to attempt
to regulate private consumer and employment arbitration (so far through unsuccessful
efforts to pass federal legislation, the Arbitration Fairness Act, prohibiting the use of
mandatory pre-dispute contractual arbitration in consumer, employment and franchise
disputes). A few states (like California) have managed to add a few protections for
consumers (conﬂicts of interest of arbitrators) through civil procedure rules or other
state legislation (which is now often invalidated in federal court as pre-empted by the
Federal Arbitration Act). This attempt to ‘regulate’ consumer arbitration has, however,
also led to some efforts in the private sector to make consumer or employment arbitration subject to some basic ‘due process protocols’.119
In addition to private contracting, both at the industry and individual level, smaller
communities have also continued to use informal out of court processes in a variety
of contexts. Religious and ethnic groups have long offered their own courts, mediation
and arbitration services for disputes within their own communities. Recently, tensions
have been exposed when, as in family law, the formal court must still be the ﬁnal
authority on divorce or spousal or child support, when one party asks for acceptance of the agreement of a religious court, or when one party seeks public court
orders to require another party to satisfy legal requirements of the religious court for
secular beneﬁt.120 The interplay of private religious courts and doctrines for dispute
resolution has become a legal issue in a variety of multi-cultural nations, including
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the US, Canada,121 the UK and Australia in the common law world and France and
other legal regimes in Asia and Europe. Recently, several states in the US (Oklahoma,
Arizona and Nebraska) famously used their ‘democratic’ referenda and legislative processes to ban the use of ‘foreign, international or Shar’ia law’ in their state courts.122
Many other states (eg Alabama, Texas, South Carolina, Wyoming and South Dakota)
are attempting in one form or other to do the same thing. Most of us in the legal
academy and many, but not all, of those on the bench (the judiciary) believe these
laws are unconstitutional, but they represent a strong sentiment to police the use of
communitarian, religious and ethnic enclaves’ use of their own formal rules and laws,
as well as processes. Religious courts or arbitration or mediation centres in family
matters are used by Jews (Bet Din123), Christians124 and Muslims,125 and for the most
part have had their outcomes conﬁrmed by courts which apply the regular standards
for enforcing arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Local communities have also used informal processes (consensus building, deliberative democracy, public policy mediation126) to resolve land use, environmental, cultural
and ethnic conﬂict, budget allocation and other disputes, outside of formal processes.
With a new cadre of professionals speciﬁcally trained to engage complex communities
in such disputes and group decision making, complex multi-party disputes may be
resolved with agreements, often contingent, and monitoring programmes (such as in
resource management, land use and zoning, waste siting) which straddle public and
private decision making rules and bodies.127 The legal issue often then involves whether
a public body, such as a regional zoning land-use or federal resource agency, must participate and approve agreements reached in private settings, outside of formal court,
legislative or administrative hearings. These processes may themselves now be quite
‘formal’, adhering to community developed rules of engagement, delegation of state,
federal or local authority, but such negotiated agreements still often require formal
governmental approval, and what was accomplished through these creative informal
processes may unravel when returned to more formal and adversary proceedings.128
Thus, the conundrums, paradoxes and issues in these ‘semi-formal’ forms of
dispute resolution include the relation of the private form of dispute resolution and
its ‘outputs’ or agreements to the state—when and if one party seeks to move dispute
resolution from one sector to the other—for appellate review, appeal to public or state
121
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values, or to get state enforcement of relief or to reverse what was accomplished in
the more informal process.

V. W H AT L I T T L E W E K N O W A B O U T D I S P U T E R E S O L U T I O N U S E A N D
REGULATION

Since the beginning of the modern ADR movement in the US, scholars have called
for the ability to empirically study and assess claims made about the relative uses and
satisfaction with such processes. Evaluation research (such as in the RAND studies
reported above) has sought to look at comparisons between different processes. Social
scientists at the Federal Judicial Center have long urged uniform reporting requirements and uniformity of case types and categories on case dockets for comparisons
between cases and types of process and for accurate time series to study developments over time. Alas, such uniformity of data reporting does not, for the most part,
exist, even within the federal system. Much like the US Census, which has changed its
categories of ‘nationality’ in almost every decennial census,129 case categories, dispositions and other reported information are ever changing. Below, I report on some of the
available data from both court (public) and a few private sources.130
I reviewed a sample of federal and state court ADR systems for whatever data
were available on cases actually referred to ADR and whatever data were available
on dispositions. The data available are scanty (it appears the Administrative Office
of the Courts at the federal level is not keeping track of ADR statistics by court on
a regular basis). Courts vary on their requirements to use some form of ADR (based
on local rules, local legal cultures and interpretations of the requirements to provide
some form of ADR in all federal cases, as now required by the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998—which ‘required’ use of some form of ADR in every federal
court, but provided no funding appropriation for this purpose). Examples of the kind
of information that has been collected are the rates of mediation success in some
courts. For example, the Eastern District of New York (including two counties of New
York City and the rest of Long Island) tracks mediation success rates by case type.
Successful mediations resulting in settlement vary by case type, ranging (for a sevenyear reporting period from 2003 to 2010) from 38.5% in employment discrimination,
36% in other civil rights, 43% in personal injury matters, 32% in contract disputes
and 51% in insurance matters to a much lower rate for intellectual property matters
(22% in trademark, 30% in copyright and a low of 13% in patent cases). The Western
District of Missouri (another relatively active district in ADR) offers voluntary facilitative mediation, early neutral evaluation, case evaluation and settlement conferences
with most usage of settlement conferences (54%); followed by mediation (34%) and
lower rates of utilisation of neutral case evaluation.
Over time, use of (voluntary) mediation has increased somewhat in federal courts
offering such processes; early neutral evaluation practices are used, though only in a
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few courts, and are the least used in courts that provide a fuller menu of choice (the
Northern District of California (federal) and state courts in Michigan were primary
innovators in this evaluative form of ADR), and settlement conferences (with judges
or magistrate judges) remain the most common form of ADR in the federal courts. A
few courts (a federal statute provided legal support for experimental, now permanent,
arbitration programmes for ﬁve federal districts) require mandatory arbitration of civil
cases below a certain value. The arbitrators are volunteer panel lawyers and ‘appeals’
from those arbitrations are de novo to trial, with a ‘penalty’ of costs if the appellant
does not do better at trial than in the arbitration. These practices have been challenged
in the US as violating the constitutional ‘right to jury’ in civil cases under the Seventh
Amendment, but these challenges have failed as long as some ability to go to trial after
arbitration is still permitted, even if it is ‘taxed’ with a bond or penalty payment.131
Offers of settlement under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules also ‘tax’ refusals to settle by
requiring any party to whom a settlement offer is made and refused to pay legal fees
and costs if that party does not do better than the settlement offer at trial.
All federal courts of appeal now offer mediation before argument; all but one circuit
now employs paid staff mediators. The District of Columbia (in the nation’s capital)
still relies on volunteer lawyers. It is difficult to compare numbers and practices in
particular districts because processes vary so much. Virtually all federal courts rely on
unpaid lawyers to conduct ADR sessions, with the exception of mandatory settlement
conferences which are conducted either by full Article III (life-time appointed) judges
or statutory magistrate judges. Whether such court adjunct personnel should be paid
from public funds remains a controversial issue. A few district court rules provide for
the parties to pay fees for mediators beyond a certain minimal period of mediation
(usually one day or more than ﬁve hours). Different courts provide for different forms
of training and assessment of such court adjuncts, and there has been concern about
addition to or removal from the ‘rolls’ of this prestigious ‘federal’ listing, often used
for career enhancement.
What should be clear from this simple report is that there is a profound irony in
federal ADR—when the 1938 federal rules of procedure were enacted the idea was for
some uniformity of federal procedural rules in civil matters; the reality with respect
to ADR practice is that it varies enormously by local rule, local legal culture and
practice.132
At the state level, most states do provide some statistical summaries of the uses of
various forms of ADR, but methods of data collection, categories about which data
are collected and outcome measures vary considerably. For example, Florida, which is
another state which pioneered use of ADR (and provides rules for training and credentialising of its court mediators), reports extensive data by district (circuit) within
the state (documenting great local variations in use of ADR) on case types ordered to
ADR (mediation primarily with some arbitration and abandonment of another form
131
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of ADR, summary jury trial formerly used in Florida133) and ratios of cases ordered
to ADR with ADR actually conducted, ranging by case type and locale from a low of
about 33% to close to 100%, evidencing great variations in the acceptance of ADR
local ‘cultures’. New York reports that, for a seven-year reporting period (2002–09),
close to 300,000 cases in the state were submitted to some form of ADR, also with
great variations by city and county (eg 80,000 for New York City and less than 100
for Hamilton County, a more rural county). The percentage of cases resolved by some
form of ADR in this same period ranged from 45% for the whole state to 41% for
New York City and a low of 16% in Saratoga, with highs as much as 60–70% in
some counties (including Westchester, a suburban county just north of New York City,
which has been an active locale for training mediators). Massachusetts, another state
active in promoting ADR reports high settlement rates of cases, without allocating
reports to particular ADR processes.
States vary considerably in the rules and regulations promulgated for use of ADR,
ranging from mandatory assignments for all cases under a particular monetary
amount, particular case types, exceptions for some case types (eg common exclusions
for constitutional cases, prisoner’s rights, social security cases), to court informal referrals or compelled order to ADR after settlement conferences, voluntary selection or
mandated referral in particular matters (eg in medical malpractice, some form of ADR
is often required as a condition precedent for bringing a lawsuit). States vary in their
practices as to whether they use ‘opt-out’ rules (all cases under certain values automatically subjected to some form of mediation or ADR, unless the parties have a good
reason for opting out) or ‘opt-in’ systems in which parties choose to use some form
of ADR. There is at present a very robust debate in court practice and the academic
literature about which is ‘better’ for the parties (where party choice is the primary
value) or the ‘system’ (higher settlement rates and reduced costs). Many states have
subject-speciﬁc statutes requiring informal dispute resolution mechanisms for particular kinds of disputes, often medical malpractice, certain kinds of consumer disputes
(eg ‘lemon laws’ for defective cars or products134). As a result of the 2008 economic
downturn, it was predicted that there would be an increase in use of various form of
ADR as parties could less afford expensive litigation. In 2012, the state of California
announced it would close hundreds of local courts in a multi-million dollar budget
cut for governmental expenditures. Although many predicted that this would increase
the use of mediation, many local jurisdictions, including my own in Los Angeles, also
terminated the local court mediation programme to reduce additional court costs.135
Many consumer and employment contracts now contain mandatory arbitration
clauses, challenges to which have been denied as ‘pre-empted’ under federal law by
the Federal Arbitration Act. A few states, concerned about claimed abuses in some
forms of ADR (conﬂicts of interests of mediators or arbitrators, coerced settlements

133
J Alﬁni, ‘Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions
of Participating Lawyers’ (1989) 4 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 213.
134
S Talesh, ‘The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How Manufacturers Construct the Meaning of
Consumer Law’ (2009) 43 Law & Society Review 527.
135
Although many decried this action, some private mediators I know think this is a good result as there
was little quality control of the state-operated ‘volunteer’ mediator programme. Private mediators hope
that, at least in bigger cases, the parties will now choose the more expensive, but allegedly better quality,
private mediation services they provide.

444

Carrie Menkel-Meadow

in some court-annexed mediation programmes), have attempted regulation of ADR
practice through special rules of procedure (California has conﬂicts of interests rules
for arbitrators in its rules of civil procedure), or in lawyer or other professional ethics
codes. The status of state regulation of arbitration is now clouded by a US Supreme
Court case which held that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts, at the federal level,
any effort at state interference with or regulation of arbitration.136
Although the use of contractual arbitration has now been federally ‘legitimated’ by
a series of Supreme Court cases sustaining such clauses, how those arbitrations are
actually conducted remains essentially private, determined by contractual provisions or
by the private rule systems of the leading arbitral tribunals and administering organisations, such as the American Arbitration Association and JAMS. Although some
states have attempted to regulate some aspects of arbitration, such as by restricting
and limiting its use in some contexts (consumer, employment or other matters), most
of those statutes have now been rendered void by the US Supreme court’s recent
decision in AT&T Mobility v Concepcion (holding that a state ruling that class
actions in arbitration were permissible was ‘pre-empted’ by federal arbitration law).
In the mediation area there is very little state legislation, except for those states which
have provided for conﬁdentiality protections and in some cases, evidentiary privileges
for mediators (and/or arbitrators)137 (who cannot be called to testify in later formal
legal proceedings).
The US does not, at either the federal or state level, regulate who may be an ADR
professional—there are no certiﬁcation or licensing requirements for mediators, arbitrators or others who attempt to resolve disputes ‘informally’, though, increasingly,
some states, eg Florida, Massachusetts and California, do attempt to regulate training
and standards for court-adjunct ADR professionals. Mediators and arbitrators in
private settings often are non-lawyer professionals such as engineers and architects in
construction disputes, accountants in ﬁnancial and contractual cases, social works and
psychologists in family matters.
Mediation is increasingly used in more and more settings (internal family issues
without dissolution, education matters, probate, internal business relationships
without lawsuits, organisational dispute resolution) that are far removed from courts
and not subject to any reporting or regulatory schemes. Thus, the ability to generate
any accurate accounting of just how much mediation or ADR there is is virtually
impossible.138
Whatever data and formal rules may be available from the formal and ‘semi-formal’
arenas, the largest sector of ‘ADR’ is clearly private (involving voluntary and now
contractually mandated mediation, arbitration or choices to use some of the newer
hybrids), and the private sector remains ﬁercely private. I have served on various study
committees which have attempted to gather data on the use, outcomes and other
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information on private dispute resolution. Although a few studies have now appeared
in some sectors (comparative employment arbitral data from the American Arbitration
Association and the US Postal Service,139 and some data on consumer arbitration),140
analysing whether employees and consumers fare equitably when disputing with larger
companies or ‘repeat players’141 (the results are decidedly mixed), most information
from the largest private providers of dispute resolution services remains relatively
obscure, with no formal requirements to report information. One ADR provider
sought to become publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, which would have
required public disclosures, but that effort proved unsuccessful.142 Having had some
access to some informal data from one of the largest providers of private arbitration and mediation services in the country (JAMS and another private ‘ﬁrm’ providing
mediation services) I have seen ﬁrst hand one aspect of the ‘repeat player effect’. Large
companies with multiple disputes (in California, the major banks, the major supermarkets, Kaiser Permanente Health Care, Toyota car dealerships, etc) tend to use the
same providers over and over again. Thus the providers have some incentive to ‘please’
their repeat player clients with awards that favour them to continue to receive business.
Since all kinds of contracts now provide for arbitration or mediation by some of these
major private providers, the ‘one-shotters’ (consumers, tenants, employees) may not
even know how often a provider works for a particular company and will therefore be
ignorant of possible biases, incentives, etc. (My own home rental agreement some years
ago included a form requiring arbitration with JAMS for any dispute arising under the
lease. As a dispute resolution professional, I struck the clause from the contract.143)
Thus, to the extent that we know so little about how much arbitration actually
occurs and how it is in fact conducted in the private sphere, it is difficult to assess how
it should and could be regulated. In the last 15 years a wide variety of consumer and
employee representative groups have attempted to pass federal legislation, the Arbitration Fairness Act, to limit uses of mandatory arbitration in a wide variety of contexts,
so far to no avail (with the exception of one statute that prevents mandatory arbitration of dealer-franchisee disputes among car manufacturers and dealers; this special
statute does not restrict the use of mandatory arbitration for consumer purchases of
automobiles!).144

date?

139
See L Bingham, Mediation at Work: Transforming Workplace Conﬂict at the United States Postal
Service (Washington, DC, IBM Center for The Business of Government, 2003); L Bingham, ‘Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect’ (1997) 1 Employment Rights and Employment Policy Journal 189.
140
Searle Civil Justice Institute, Consumer Arbitration before the American Arbitration Association
(Chicago, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, Northwestern University School of
Law, 2009).
141
C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Do the Haves Come Out Ahead in Alternative Justice Systems? Repeat Players in
ADR’ (1999) 15 Ohio State Journal Dispute Resolution 19.
142
Judicate, originally based in Philadelphia, sought to become a publicly traded company in the late
1980s. JAMS, the most successful of private ADR providers remains a private corporation.
143
W Glaberson, ‘Misuse of Arbitration?’, New York Times, 1996, 1.
144
Congress has provided that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are not valid in two instances. The
Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001 protects car dealers from arbitration
imposed by car manufacturers, but interestingly does nothing to prohibit car dealers from requiring their
customers to arbitrate future disputes, as has become common. Another piece of legislation protects
members of the military from arbitration imposed by payday lenders. It is ‘unlawful for any creditor to
extend consumer credit to a covered member or a dependent of such member with respect to which . . . the
creditor requires the borrower to submit to arbitration or imposes onerous legal notice provisions in the case
of a dispute’ (10 USC § 987(e)(3) (2000)).

446

Carrie Menkel-Meadow
V I . AS S E S S I N G J U S T I C E I N P L U R A L P R O C E D U R A L P R A C T I C E S

Dispute resolution in the US is now characterised by multiple or parallel tracks, what
I and others have called ‘process pluralism’. Parties, depending on their economic and
legal circumstances, may often choose between formal legal proceedings or less formal
forms of dispute resolution. On the other hand, some parties may have no choice
at all (such as the ‘helpless’ consumers and employees who are required to agree to
mandatory arbitration processes in their form (adhesion) contracts). In many matters,
well-endowed disputants may switch from one form of dispute resolution to another—
starting with litigation and then shifting to either court-mandated or chosen mediation, negotiation or arbitration, using private or publicly paid-for third-party neutrals.
In other cases, parties may choose informal forms of dispute resolution and then seek
enforcement of mediation or negotiated agreements or arbitral awards in public courts
for enforcement (injunctive relief or execution on assets). The terrain is diverse, uphill,
downhill and often rocky for the uninitiated or not so well endowed. Although the
‘ADR’ movement was originally formed to make access to justice easier and to reduce
the reliance on legal or other professionals, the truth is that the landscape of disputing
has indeed become more and more complex, with the predictions of outcomes, costs
and strategies harder and harder to produce with any degree of accuracy.
The ﬁeld of dispute resolution and litigation in the US now contains both scholars
and practitioners who urge the return to courts and trials for more transparency, equalisation of rules and process and general monitoring of both processes and outcomes,
many claiming that a trial rate (in civil matters) of less than 2 per cent of all matters
ﬁled is an inadequate number for a democratic society to produce legal precedents and
fair process. For these commentators, informal or even ‘semi-formal’ process may be
considered to be ‘empty suits’ (no visibility or accountability to those outside of the
dispute resolution process), to continue the social dressing metaphor. Or, as another
critique, one form of dispute resolution may seem to be ‘masquerading’ as another—
seeming to have court formality or approval when, in reality, there is little to no (not
even ‘informal’) review of what occurs in the dispute resolution process. Others among
us, and I am one of those, still prefer to see process pluralism as offering the opportunity for party choice, both about process and about the kinds of outcomes that might
be possible (trades, new creative solutions, shared commitments to agreements). I have
always preferred a full closet from which to select my clothes for a particular event!
Yet, I remain haunted or affected by Lon Fuller’s claims that each process has its
own ‘integrity’ or purpose—one set of values (privacy, on-going relationships, spider
web-like intertwined issues in a single problem) for one kind of problem may dictate
one kind of process (mediation) that would be inappropriate for another kind of
problem (the elimination of injustice in a public institution like education: Brown
v Board of Education). Thus, Lon Fuller and others would suggest that we should
be clear about both the purposes and uses of each process. Attempts to specify in
advance particular processes for particular kinds of disputes have not been particularly
successful in the US (some courts prohibit the use of ADR in constitutional cases,
prisoner’s cases, civil rights matters, pro se (self-representation); others do not), in
part because, in the hands of skilled parties, lawyers and third-party neutrals, almost
any informal or semi-formal process can be made more ﬂexible, cheaper, faster and
more creative than formal processes, so process choice and effectiveness often turns
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on the particular actors in the process, not on the structure itself. Fuller’s attempts to
uncover the jurisprudential bases for process choice is now being applied to international or transnational disputing too, where ‘the formal’ has been even less effective,
in public, if not private dispute resolution.145 Yet, it remains unclear whether it is
structure and function or personality146 that determines how fair, just and effective a
particular process is.
Some years ago, when I was consulting for a major international organization, I
was asked to develop a formula for assessing the ‘success’ of any system of dispute
resolution. The exercise was instructive for me because I realised that we need both
qualitative and quantitative measures of effective dispute resolution, and also that
‘measures’ of success for a ‘system’147 may be different from measures of ‘justice’
or ‘satisfaction’ for disputants or users of any process. I offered the following set of
criteria, variables and factors in the assessment of dispute processes (a combination of
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ measures), while recognising that no single study could ever
hope to include measures of them all.

Quantitative or “Objective” Measures
 Number of conﬂicts or disputes in relevant ‘universe’ (which and how many form
into formal claim or complaint)
 Number of contacts or cases (in a particular process, as compared to the full
‘universe’ of possible cases or comparable cases in another process)
 Numbers of issues
 Number of cases resolved/settled/closed/disposed of (‘settlement rates’)
 Number of cases referred to another process
 Number of cases dropped
 Case types (categories within systems, eg employment promotion, dismissal, communication, etc)
 Numbers of parties
 Types of agreements, resolutions, outcomes
 Time to process case
 Cost of processing case—to complainant, to third-party neutral, to programme or
system
 Comparisons (where possible) of all of the above comparable cases in different
systems
 Comparisons of pre-conﬂict resolution programme claiming (grievance systems,
litigation) or violence with post-programmatic claiming
 Comparisons of rates of compliance with agreements, judgments or orders
145
R Michaels, ‘A Fuller Concept of Law beyond the State? Thoughts on Lon Fuller’s Contributions to
the Jurisprudence of Transnational Dispute Resolution’ (2011) 2(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 417.
146
D Curran, J Sebenius and M Watkins, ‘Two Paths to Peace: Contrasting George Mitchell in Northern
Ireland with Richard Holbrooke in Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (2004) 20 Negotiation Journal 513.
147
The new ﬁeld of ‘dispute system design’ in the US (and other countries) is tasked with both developing and evaluating ‘systems’ of dispute resolution in both public and private settings where there are
iterative disputes, see (2009) 14 Harvard Negotiation Law Review special issue ‘Dispute System Design’.
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 Durability/longevity of outcomes
 Longitudinal comparisons of changes in usage, time for processing, case types, etc
 Demographic data on users, third-party neutrals, and other facilitators or
professionals
 Variations in usage, outcomes, solutions by demographics, and differential characteristics of disputants and third-party neutrals, eg ‘experience’ ratings
 Awareness of ability to choose different processes (an attitudinal measure)

Qualitative or Subjective Measures
 Criteria for selecting particular processes
 Client satisfaction
 Improved relationships (post-conﬂict societies (eg Rwanda), families, workplaces,
commercial relations)
 Improved communication
 Enhanced workplace productivity
 Learned conﬂict resolution/communication/relational skills (‘transformative’ mutual
intersubjective understandings or learned use of new processes, eg lawyers using
mediation and other forms of problem solving)
 ‘Better’ outcomes (more creative, individually tailored, deeper solutions)
 Perceived self-determination/autonomy/control over decision making
 Compliance with national, systemic, family, company, workplace and contractual
norms/rules when legitimacy is less questioned
 Perceptions of fairness, justice and legitimacy of process
 Trust in institutions, both dispute processing and others
 Resolution of systemic issues (proactive conﬂict resolution, policy changes)
 ‘Value added’ to organisation or institution
But this list, whether exhaustive or not, cannot quantify, combine or ‘equalise’ measures
of ‘justice’ with measures of ‘efficiency’, and disputants cannot subject themselves
either simultaneously or sequentially to formal, semi-formal or informal processes to
determine which works best for them in a particular matter. Yet, I worry that, while
formal processes produce some modicum of review through formal procedures, court
scrutiny, and published decisions and data, and informal processes promise only that
the parties can do what they want ‘if they agree’ (consent based), then ‘semi-formal’
processes are perhaps the most problematic processes. Informal processes are those
we believe the parties have consented to—are they? ‘Semi-formal’ processes may be
monitored (‘court annexed’ or use of private arbitration tribunal rules of procedure)
or made more formal by accessing state power (whether judicial or otherwise) for
enforcement, but often, they are not. Court annexed programmes do not necessarily
get reviewed by judges or other government officials. Private mediation and arbitration
agreements and awards are not generally available to parties outside of the processes.
Those who choose private processes, even with elaborate internal rule systems, may
also have no recourse to subsequent review, especially when agreements are conﬁdential. (Perhaps this explains why so many of the newer international dispute resolution
organisations are now using or proposing appellate processes, eg the World Trade
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Organization Appellate Body, ICSID, both for review and for transparency and consistency of results.)148
Is process pluralism always a good thing (is there a time when too many choices
may be a bad idea?149), and how are we to know? When we have so many choices, and
so many different possible measures of what constitutes a fair, just or good process, it
may be virtually impossible to specify a uniform and universally satisfying dress code.
So, in the US, for the near future, it may be ‘come as you are’—formal, informal or
‘semi-formal’. Perhaps in a country this diverse the choice of dispute process should
be similarly diverse, but it makes one wonder, along with Lon Fuller, whether each
process choice must or should have its own integrity (and policed rules?). I would
not wear a ballgown to a barbecue and I would not wear a bathing suit to the courthouse. Do we need a dress code or forms of regulation for different kinds of dispute
resolution? If so, how should we ‘dress’ for different kinds of disputes and processes?
What rules of transparency, conﬁdentiality or publicity, fairness, ethics, conﬂicts of
interests, disclosures, procedures and accountability can be applied across all these different forms of process? I have more questions than I have answers (as I stand before
my closet and try to decide what to wear to court, a negotiation session, a mediation,
arbitration or session with my organisation’s ombuds).
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